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Abstract
We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: as more of one’s
predecessors choose an action, the payoff from choosing that action decreases. If congestion
on either action can get so large that an agent would prefer to take the other action no
matter his beliefs about the state, then herds cannot occur. To the extent that “switching”
away from the more popular action also reveals some private information, social learning is
improved. The absence of herding is not enough to guarantee complete learning, however,
as information cascades can occur through perpetual but uninformative switching between
actions. For bounded private beliefs, we provide conditions that guarantee complete learn-
ing and conditions that guarantee bounded learning. Congestion costs have ambiguous
effects on welfare as measured by the proportion of agents who choose the superior action.
We apply our results to markets where congestion costs arise through responsive pricing
and to queuing problems where agents dislike waiting for service.
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1 Introduction
We examine how rational agents learn from observing the actions — but not directly the
information — of other rational agents. The distinguishing feature of the environment we
study is a class of payoff interdependence: as more of an agent’s predecessors choose one
action, the agent’s payoff from choosing that action decreases. We term this kind of payoff
interdependence congestion costs. Congestion costs naturally arise directly or indirectly
in many economic contexts. As more individuals purchase a product, prices may increase
(Avery and Zemsky, 1998), waiting times for made-to-order goods such as airplanes may
lengthen, short-term supplies may run out, or quality of service may worsen. In some cases,
people may have an intrinsic preference for avoiding options that others flock to, i.e. for
“anti-conformity”.
The model we develop in Section 2 builds on the canonical models of observational
learning (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000). A sequence
of agents each choose between two actions, A or B. One of the actions is superior to
the other; while all agents share common preferences on this dimension, each has private
information about which action is superior. Each agent acts based on his private signal
and the observed choices of all predecessors. We enrich the standard model by assuming
that in addition to desiring the superior action, agents also dislike (at least weakly) taking
an action more when more of their predecessors have chosen it. While the model is quite
general about the distributions of private signals, we focus on the case of bounded private
beliefs, i.e. where private signals have bounded informativeness. We parameterize how
much agents care about congestion costs relative to taking the superior action by a marginal-
rate-of-substitution parameter k ≥ 0. When k = 0, the model collapses to the standard
one without congestion costs. Our interest is in the long-run outcomes of games where
k > 0: does society eventually learn which action is superior, will herds form, will there be
information cascades, and how does congestion affect welfare?
Section 3 develops some preliminaries about individual decision-making as a function of
private beliefs and the public history of actions. We then study the properties of asymptotic
social learning in Section 4. In the canonical model without congestion, all agents eventually
take the same action, i.e. herds necessarily form in finite time.1 Moreover, learning is
bounded in the sense that society never learns with certainty, even asymptotically, which
action is superior. We find that both these conclusions also hold in the current environment
so long as the net congestion cost (i.e. the difference in congestion cost incurred by taking
one action rather then the other) that an agent may face is bounded in absolute value
by some threshold that is sufficiently small relative to the marginal-rate-of-substitution
parameter k.
1Throughout this introduction, we suppress technical details such as “almost sure” caveats.
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By contrast, if the net congestion cost can become sufficiently high, then it clear that
herds cannot form: should a long enough sequence of agents take action A, then eventually
someone will take action B, even if extremely confident that A is superior. When an
agent’s “switch” from A to B also reveals his private information (partially or fully), social
learning is enhanced. As it turns out, however, the impossibility of herding does not suffice
to guarantee complete asymptotic learning: after some time, agents may perpetually cycle
between the two actions without conveying any information about their private signals. In
other words, an information cascade may begin wherein every agent’s action is preordained
despite the absence of a herd; this phenomenon (novel to the best of our knowledge) can
occur no matter how much agents care about congestion relative to taking the superior
action, i.e. no matter the value of k. Indeed, there are interesting classes of congestion
costs for which, no matter the value of k, such an outcome will necessarily arise in finite
time.
We show that whether such cyclical behavior and cascades can occur depends on the
incremental effect that any one agent’s action has on the net congestion cost faced by his
successors’. In particular, we identify properties of congestion costs that ensure bounded
learning asymptotically even when herds cannot arise. Conversely, we also provide con-
ditions that guarantee complete asymptotic learning. It is worth noting that what drives
complete learning when it arises in our model is not that every agent behaves informatively;
rather it is an inevitable return to some agent behaving informatively. Put differently, even
when there is complete learning it will often be the case that on any sample path of play
there are (many) phases of “temporary information cascades”.
A natural question is what happens when agents care little about congestion, i.e. the
marginal-rate-of-substitution parameter k > 0 vanishes. When total congestion costs are
bounded, then there is bounded asymptotic learning for k small enough. However, when
total congestion can grow arbitrarily large as sufficiently many consecutive agents play the
same action, then under a mild additional condition, there is essentially complete asymptotic
learning as k → 0. Intuitively, only at near-certain public beliefs can vanishingly small
incremental congestion costs produce the sort of uninformative cycling that stalls learning.
In a sense, this result can be interpreted as a fragility of the conventional bounded learning
result; Section 4 clarifies to what extent such an interpretation is valid.
Section 5 turns to the asymptotic properties of the frequency of actions and questions
of welfare. We argue that the latter is closely linked to the former. We first provide
suitable conditions on congestion costs under which the action frequency would converge if
the superior action were known from the outset. It turns out that under these conditions
the action frequency in the game of observational learning also converges, and moreover,
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converges to exactly the same value as if the superior action were known all along.2
Using these results, we show that congestion costs have ambiguous effects on welfare
as measured by the proportion of agents taking the superior action in the long-run. Al-
though the presence of congestion costs may improve society’s learning about which action
is superior, agents may end up choosing the superior action less frequently in expectation
than they would in the absence of congestion costs, and even under autarky. However, in
other cases, eventually a larger fraction of agents take the superior action under congestion
costs than without congestion costs. Indeed, the fraction of agents who choose the superior
action under congestion costs may even converge to one. As a corollary, we deduce an
extremely simple tax scheme (whose proceeds can be redistributed, if desired) that a social
planner can use in the model without congestion to achieve the first-best outcome in the
long run.
In Section 6, we discuss two economic applications that fit into our general framework.
In the first application, congestion costs are effectively induced by how market prices evolve
over time. We show that our analysis accommodates a class of reduced-form price-setting
rules that correspond to a range of market-competition assumptions from monopoly at one
end to Bertrand competition at the other. The second application explores a queuing model
where players are “served” in sequence, but service only occurs with some probability in
each period. Congestion costs here arise from agents’ dislike for delay in being served.
This paper is not the first to obtain complete asymptotic learning in an observational
learning environment. Lee (1993) shows that when players’ action spaces are a continuum—
rich enough to reveal their posteriors—then for reasonable preferences, the true state is
eventually learned. Even with only a finite number actions, Smith and Sørensen (2000)
show that when players’ private beliefs are unbounded, complete learning obtains when
players have the same preferences.3 By contrast, complete learning can obtain in our model
even under a binary action space and bounded private beliefs. It is also worth noting that
in the settings explored by Lee (1993) and Smith and Sørensen (2000), every player’s action
is informative, i.e. depends non-trivially upon his private signal. As already noted, this is
typically not the case here.
Our work relates most closely to Avery and Zemsky (1998), who build off a model by
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) of sequential trade for an asset of common but unknown value.
2This occurs in some cases due to complete learning but in others despite bounded learning.
3Intuitively, information cascades cannot occur under unbounded private beliefs: whatever the current public
belief, a player can receive an opposing signal strong enough to overturn it. This is an incomplete intuition
because the absence of information cascades is compatible with a failure of complete learning, but this requires
bounded private beliefs (Herrera and Ho¨rner, 2011). Under bounded private beliefs, Goeree et al. (2006) prove
a learning result when players’ preferences include a full-support private-values component in addition to the
common objective of matching action to state; see also Goeree et al. (2007). Acemoglu et al. (2011) show that
under bounded private beliefs, learning can occur if not all players necessarily observe all predecessors’ choices.
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In their simplest variant, a market-maker sets the price of the risky asset at the start of
every period t to equal the public belief based on all information revealed through period
t − 1.4 Because the price fully incorporates all earlier traders’ private information, each
trader buys when her private information about the value of the asset is positive and sells
when negative, i.e. each trader acts informatively and and hence the market price converges
to the asset’s true value. Market prices in Avery and Zemsky (1998) play a similar role
to congestion costs in our model: the more predecessors who buy the asset, the more a
trader wishes to sell the asset, everything else equal. Our model generalises Avery and
Zemsky (1998) not only by extending beyond the realm of markets and specific theories
of price formation, but also by showing that complete learning can obtain even in settings
where most, and indeed nearly all, players act uninformatively. Furthermore, we also show
that different theories of price formation can substantially affect the conclusion of complete
learning.
A small literature explores direct congestion or queueing costs but focuses on differ-
ent issues than we do. Drehmann et al. (2007) conduct an experiment that includes a
treatment with congestion costs, which they show reduce the average length of runs of con-
secutive actions modestly compared to the no-congestion benchmark. Veeraraghavan and
Debo (2011) develop a queuing model where agents observe only an aggregate statistic of
predecessors’ choices but not the entire history. Because Bayesian inference in this model is
complex, Veeraraghavan and Debo (2011) do not analyse asymptotic learning but instead
characterise some properties of equilibrium play in early rounds.
Finally, our work connects more broadly with research on social learning when there is
direct payoff interdependence between agents. A significant fraction of this literature has
focussed on sequential elections (e.g. Dekel and Piccione, 2000; Ali and Kartik, forthcoming,
and the references therein), but other work also studies coordination problems (Dasgupta,
2000), common-value auctions (Neeman and Orosel, 1999), settings with network external-
ities (Choi, 1997), and when agents partially internalize the welfare of future agents (Smith
and Sørensen, 2008). The most important distinction here is that in the current paper, we
focus on a different kind of payoff interdependence and ignore forward-looking incentives.
While the latter is a limitation for some applications, it is appropriate in other contexts
and permits a fairly general treatment of the payoff interdependence we study.5
4Thus, the market-maker loses money on average. Avery and Zemsky (1998)’s richer models with noise traders
do not share the feature.
5Drehmann et al. (2007) include treatments with forward-looking payoff externalities. They find that subjects’
behavior in these treatments do not differ significantly from myopic behavior and suggest that a purely backward-
looking analysis might make reasonably good predictions even in settings with forward-looking considerations.
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2 Model
A payoff-relevant state of the world, θ ∈ {−1, 1}, is drawn, without loss of generality, from
a uniform prior. A countable infinity of players take actions in sequence, each observing
the entire history of actions. Before choosing an action, player i gets a private signal that
is independently and identically distributed conditional on the state. Following Smith and
Sørensen (2000), we work directly with the random variable of private beliefs, which is
a player’s belief that θ = 1 after observing her signal but ignoring the history of play,
computed by Bayes rule using the uniform prior. Denote the private belief of Player i
as pi ∈ (0, 1). Given the state θ ∈ {−1, 1}, the private-belief stochastic process 〈pi〉 is
conditionally i.i.d. with conditional c.d.f. F (θ). We assume that no private signal perfectly
reveals the state of the world, which implies that F (1) and F (−1) are mutually absolutely
continuous and have common support. Denote the convex hull of that support by [b, b] ⊆
[0, 1]. To avoid trivialities, signals must be informative, which implies that b < 1/2 < b. We
focus in this paper on bounded private beliefs: b > 0 and b < 1.6 Notice that this setting
allows for continuous or discrete signals.
Denote each player’s action by ai ∈ {−1, 1} and let ai := (a1, . . . , ai) denote a history.
Player i’s preferences are given by a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui
(
ai, θ
)
:= 1{ai=θ} − kc(ai),
where 1{·} denotes an indicator function, c (·) is a state-independent congestion cost function,
and k > 0 is a scalar parameter. Gross of congestion costs, the gain from taking the
superior action (i.e. the action that matches the state) is normalized to one. The assumption
that c(·) depends only upon ai implies that congestion is “backward looking” in the sense
of only depending on predecessors’ choices. Note that because the domain of c(·) varies
with a player’s index, different players may be affected differently in terms of congestion
by common predecessors, and furthermore, different players may trade off the gain from
taking the superior action relative to congestion differently. The standard model without
congestion obtains when k = 0. For a fixed game, the scalar k could be folded into the cost
function c(·), but our parametrization allows us to discuss a sequence of congestion games
converging to a no-congestion game by holding c(·) fixed and letting k → 0.
Insofar as congestion is concerned, player i+1’s choice only depends on the net congestion
cost he faces, i.e. the additional cost of choosing a = 1 over choosing a = −1, which is given
by
∆(ai) := c(ai, 1)− c(ai,−1).
We capture the negative externality from congestion by assuming that an extra action
6The case of unbounded private beliefs (b = 0 and b = 1) is briefly discussed in the conclusion.
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of 1 (respectively, −1) causes the net congestion cost of taking action 1 to weakly rise
(respectively, weakly fall). Formally:
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity). For all ai, ∆((ai, 1)) ≥ ∆(ai) ≥ ∆((ai,−1)).
Our other maintained assumption places a mild bound on the extent to which players can
affect their immediate successors’ net congestion cost:
Assumption 2 (Quasi-bounded increments). For all m ∈ R, there exists m′ ∈ [m,∞) and
m′′ ∈ (−∞,m] such that ∆(ai) ≤ m =⇒ ∆((ai, 1)) ≤ m′ and ∆(ai) ≥ m =⇒ ∆((ai,−1)) ≥ m′′.
Assumption 2 is related to, but weaker than, requiring the incremental effect of an action
1 (or −1) on net congestion cost to be bounded. It is weaker because it doesn’t impose a
bound on the incremental effects of either action of player i when the net congestion cost
faced by i gets arbitrarily large or small. Accordingly, we refer to Assumption 2 as a “quasi-
bounded increments” assumption. See fn. 8 below for an example of how this assumption
can be violated.
2.1 Leading examples
It is useful to introduce two leading examples that satisfy all the maintained assumptions.
In both, people care only about the frequency with which their predecessors have chosen
one action over the other (rather than which predecessors chose which action), but the
examples differ in whether frequency is measured in proportional or absolute terms.
Example 1. In the linear-proportional-cost model, c(a1) = 0 and for each i ≥ 2,
c
(
ai
)
=
∑i−1
j=1 1{aj=ai}
i− 1 .
If we denote y(ai) as the fraction of agents 1, . . . , i who have chosen a = 1 under ai, then
for each i ≥ 2, ∆(ai) = 2y(ai) − 1. More generally, instead of ∆(ai) being linear in y(ai),
we could have ∆(ai) = f(y(ai)) for some function f : (0, 1) → R that is strictly increasing
but otherwise arbitrary; this defines the general proportional-costs model.7 
Example 2. In the linear-absolute-cost model, let
η(ai) =
i∑
j=1
1{aj=1},
7Note that f(·) is only defined here on the interior of the unit interval. To avoid some inessential complications,
in this example we exogenously set the first two players’ choices to be a1 = 1 and a2 = −1.
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and define c(a1) = 0 and for each i ≥ 2,
c(ai) =
{
η(ai−1) if ai = 1
i− 1− η(ai−1) if ai = −1.
Here, congestion depends upon the number of agents who have chosen action 1 rather than
the fraction, so that ∆(ai) = 2η(ai) − i.8 A general absolute-costs model has ∆(ai) =
f(η(ai))− f(i− η(ai)) for some strictly increasing f : R+ → R. 
3 Individual Decision-Making
Player i’s decision depends upon her beliefs about which action is superior as well as upon
net congestion costs. Let p be player i’s private belief that the state is θ = 1, which depends
on i’s private signal alone; let q be the public belief that the state is θ = 1, which depends
on the inference that player i makes from the history ai−1. Given q and p, i’s posterior
belief that the state is θ = 1 is given by
r(p, q) =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q) .
Let l = (1 − q)/q be the public likelihood ratio (LR), which is the inverse of the relative
likelihood of state 1; low l means that is more likely that θ = 1. We can rewrite r(p, q) as
a function of l as follows:
r(p, l) =
p
p+ (1− p)l . (1)
Clearly, r(p, l) is strictly increasing in p and strictly decreasing in l. The following lemma
describes how posterior beliefs determine action choice.9
Lemma 1. A player who has private belief p, public likelihood ratio l, and net congestion
cost ∆ chooses action 1 if and only if r(p, l) ≥ r∗(∆; k) := 1/2 + k∆/2.
8The following variant of the linear-absolute-cost example violates Assumption 2 yet satisfies Assumption 1:
∆(ai) =
{
η(ai) if η(ai) ≥ i2
η(ai)− i if η(ai) < i2 .
To see why, consider an odd i and let ai be such that η(ai) = i − η(ai) − 1. Then ∆(ai) = η(ai) − i < 0 while
∆((ai, 1)) = η(ai) + 1, which gets arbitrarily large as i→∞.
9Throughout, we ignore how to break indifference: with continuous signals, the choice doesn’t matter, and
with discrete signals, it is generically irrelevant.
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Proof. It suffices to compute
E [ui (ai = 1)− ui (ai = −1)] = r(p, l)
[
1− kc (ai−1, 1)− (0− kc (ai−1,−1))]
+ (1− r(p, l)) [0− kc (ai−1, 1)− (1− kc (ai−1,−1))]
= 2r(p, l)− (1 + k∆),
which immediately implies the result. Q.E.D.
Using Lemma 1, we can derive the net congestion cost that renders a player indifferent
between action 1 and action −1 given likelihood ratio of l and the private belief most
favorable to action 1. Formally, for any l ∈ R+, define ∆(l; k) as the unique solution to
r(b, l) = r∗(∆(l; k); k).10 Given a net congestion cost of ∆(l; k) and public likelihood of l,
any player—no matter what her private information—(weakly) prefers choosing a = −1 to
a = 1. Note that for any p, l, and ∆ ≥ ∆(l; k), we have that r(p, l) ≤ r∗(∆; k), which, by
Lemma 1, implies that the agent will uninformatively choose a = −1.
Similarly, for any l ∈ R+, define ∆(l; k) as the unique solution to r(b, l) = r∗(∆(l; k); k),
which is well defined because b > 0. In this case, ∆(l; k) is the net congestion cost that
renders a player indifferent between action 1 and action −1 given likelihood ratio l and the
private belief most favourable to action −1. Hence, for any p, l, and ∆ ≤ ∆(l; k), an agent
will uninformatively choose a = 1.
We call a player’s action informative if it depends non-trivially upon her private beliefs,
or equivalently, if ∆ ∈ (∆(l; k),∆(l; k)). The next lemma provides a number of useful
properties of the net congestion threshold functions.
Lemma 2. The net congestion threshold functions, ∆(·; ·) and ∆(·; ·), satisfy the following:
1. For any l > 0 and k > 0, ∆(l; k) > ∆(l; k). An agent’s action choice is informative
if and only if ∆ ∈ (∆(l; k),∆(l; k)); if ∆ ≥ ∆(l; k), he chooses a = −1 for any private
belief; if ∆ ≤ ∆(l; k), he chooses a = 1 for any private belief.
2. For any k > 0: (i) ∆(0; k) = ∆(0; k) = 1/k; (ii) as functions of l, both ∆(l; k) and
∆(l; k) are continuous, strictly decreasing, and converge to −1/k as l→∞; and hence,
(iii) ∆(l; k)−∆(l; k)→ 0 as l→∞ or as l→ 0.
3. For any l > 0, ∆(l; k)−∆(l; k)→∞ as k → 0.
4. ∆(l; ·) is strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) for any l > 0 that is strictly smaller
(resp. larger) than b
1−b ; similarly ∆(l; ·) is strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) for
any l > 0 that is strictly smaller (resp. larger) than b1−b .
10Uniqueness is guaranteed because r∗(·; k) is strictly increasing and unbounded above and below.
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Proof. Equation (1) and the definitions of ∆(l; k) and ∆(l; k) yield
∆(l; k) =
b− (1− b)l
k(b+ (1− b)l) ,
∆(l; k) =
b− (1− b)l
k(b+ (1− b)l) .
The lemma’s first two parts and the fourth part are straightforward to verify from the above
formulae. For the third part, observe that by the definitions, for any l > 0 and k > 0,
k(∆(l; k)−∆(l; k)) = 2(r(b, l)− r(b, l)).
Since the right hand side above is strictly positive, the result follows. Q.E.D.
1/k
Δ
lb/(1‐b) b/(1‐b)
Action ‐1 uninformative
Action 1 uninformative
1/k‐
(a) Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 2
1/k’
1/k
Δ
l
‐1/k’
‐1/k
(b) Parts 3 and 4 of Lemma 2, with k > k′ .
Figure 1 – Net congestion threshold functions.
Figure 1(a) illustrates Lemma 2’s first two observations. For net congestion costs above
∆(l; k) (the dashed line), players choose action −1 regardless of their private signal; for net
congestion costs below ∆(l; k) (the bold line), players choose action 1 regardless of their
private signal; for net congestion costs that lie between the two lines, players choose actions
that depend upon their private signals. Figure 1(b) illustrates how a change in k affects
both ∆(l; k) and ∆(l; k) (parts 3 and 4 of Lemma 2). For a given l, when k decreases, ∆(l; k)
rotates around b/(1 − b): it increases when the likelihood ratio is below b/(1 − b) and it
decreases in the complementary region. The change in ∆(l; k) is analogous. Furthermore,
for any l > 0, a decrease in k increases the difference between the two thresholds, and
moreover, this difference gets arbitrarily large as k vanishes.
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4 Learning
4.1 Concepts
Without loss of generality, assume that the true state is θ = 1. By standard arguments,
the public-likelihood-ratio stochastic process, 〈lki 〉, is a (conditional) martingale. Thus, it
almost surely converges to a random variable lk∞ such that Supp[lk∞] ⊆ [0,∞).
We say that there is complete learning if beliefs a.s. converge to the truth, i.e. Pr(lk∞ =
0) = 1. We say there is incomplete learning when Pr(lk∞ = 0) = 0, i.e. beliefs a.s. do not
converge to the truth. If there exists ε > 0 such that Pr(lk∞ > ε) = 1, we say there is bounded
learning because beliefs a.s. are bounded away from the truth. Clearly, bounded learning
implies incomplete learning but not vice-versa. There is a herd on a sample path if after
some (finite) time, all subsequent players choose the same action. There is an information
cascade on a sample path if after some (finite) time, no player’s action is informative.
In the benchmark no-congestion model of observational learning, the existing literature
has established the following results:
Remark 1. Assume k = 0. Since private beliefs are bounded, there is bounded (and hence
incomplete) learning. There is a.s. a herd; moreover, with positive probability, the herd
forms on the inferior action. Whether an information cascade can arise depends on the
distributions of private beliefs.11
Note that in the standard model without congestion, an information cascade implies a
herd. We shall see that in the current model this need not be the case.
Aside from studying learning for a given k > 0, we are also interested in what happens to
learning in the no-congestion limit as k → 0. Say that there is complete learning in the no-
congestion limit if limk→0 Pr(lk∞ = 0) = 1. Say that there is learning with high probability
in the no-congestion limit if for all ε > 0, limk→0 Pr[lk∞ < ε] = 1. Finally, there is bounded
learning in the no-congestion limit if there exists ε > 0 such that limk→0 Pr(lk∞ > ε) = 1.
Complete learning in the no-congestion limit captures the notion that limit learning
occurs almost surely. In particular, if there is complete learning for all (small enough)
k ≥ 0, then there is complete learning in the no-congestion limit. Learning with high
probability in the no-congestion limit captures the weaker notion that the sequence of
random variables lk∞ converges in probability to 0 as k → 0. Notice that even this weaker
notion of learning represents a discontinuity with the standard model under bounded beliefs,
11Regarding learning and herds, everything stated in Remark 1 except bounded learning follows from Theorem
1 in Smith and Sørensen (2000). To see that learning is bounded, define l ∈ (0, 1) by r(b, l) = 1/2. Note that
on any sample path, if l0i < l for some i, then ai = 1 independent of i’s private belief, hence l
0
i+1 = l
0
i . Now
define lˆ := 1−r(b,l)
r(b,l)
, i.e. lˆ is the posterior LR obtained from a public LR of l and the most favorable private belief;
observe that lˆ ∈ (0, l). It follows that there is no sample path in which for some i, l0i < lˆ. For a characterization
of when information cascades can and cannot arise under bounded private beliefs, see Herrera and Ho¨rner (2011).
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where the asymptotic public belief is bounded away from the truth (see Remark 1). Finally,
a case of bounded learning in the no-congestion limit resembles the standard model without
congestion.
4.2 An overview of the results
Before turning to the formal analysis, we provide the main intuitions for how different forms
of congestion costs affect the possibility of learning. This subsection conveys intuitively the
ideas behinds the theorems of Sections 4.3–4.5; in so doing, we deliberately ignore some
subtleties.
For a given k > 0, there are two potential reasons why learning may not occur. The
first is standard: it is possible that players will eventually herd (and do so uninformatively).
Whether a herd can occur in the present context depends on the cumulative effect of players’
actions on net congestion costs. During a putative herd on action 1, say, players’ net
congestion cost is increasing, i.e. it becomes increasingly more costly to choose action 1
relative to −1. If the net congestion cost never becomes prohibitively high relative to the
public likelihood ratio (which remains unchanged during an uninformative herd), the herd
persists. Figure 2(a) illustrates this possibility of uninformative herding. In contrast, if the
net congestion cost eventually becomes sufficiently high, then at some point a player will
necessarily choose action −1, thereby breaking the putative herd.12
The impossibility of uninformative herding is not per se sufficient for learning. The
second reason why learning can fail is that agents may perpetually switch between the two
actions while never conveying any information about private beliefs. Figure 2(b) illustrates
this possibility in a particularly stark fashion: eventually each agent just takes the opposite
action of his predecessor. Naturally, such an outcome is only possible under suitable net
congestion cost functions; Theorem 3 below identifies a sufficient condition. In particular,
if the incremental effect that any player’s action eventually has on net congestion costs
becomes negligible, perpetual uninformative oscillation can never occur, no matter the
value of k. This is illustrated in Figure 2(c); Theorem 2 below develops the point into a
complete learning result. Even when uninformative oscillations between actions can occur
for a given value of k, they can only do so when a player’s incremental effect on net
congestion cost is sufficiently large relative to the public likelihood ratio. For example, in
Figure 2(b), oscillation between the two “white” dots is uninformative under k, yet for
k′ < k, behavior at the lower of those points is informative because that point now lies in
between the threshold curves corresponding to k′. As long as incremental congestion effects
12More precisely, there cannot be a herd on action 1 following the history ai if lim ∆((ai, 1, 1, . . .) > 1/k, and
hence there can never be a herd on action 1 if infai lim ∆((a
i, 1, 1, . . .)) > 1/k. Analogous statements hold for
herds on action −1.
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are bounded, when k becomes small uninformative oscillation cannot occur forever except
at very extreme public likelihood ratios; Theorem 1 below elaborates this idea.
1/k
Δ
l
Sup Δ
1/k‐
(a) Uninformative herding.
1/k’
1/k
Δ
l
1/k’
‐1/k
‐
(b) Uninformative oscillations, k > k′.
1/k
Δ
l
1/k‐
(c) Absence of perpetual uninformative oscilla-
tions.
Figure 2 – Net-congestion costs and learning.
To further substantiate these notions, consider the linear versions of Example 1 and
Example 2. In the linear-proportional-cost model, the incremental effect on net congestion
cost of a player’s action eventually vanishes. Hence, for any k > 0, perpetual uninformative
oscillation cannot occur; the only force that can prevent learning is herding. When k < 1,
congestion costs never rise to a level sufficient to break a herd. When k ≥ 1, congestion
costs eventually do become high enough to prevent herds. In the linear-absolute-cost model,
congestion costs can always get high enough to prevent a herd. However, since each player’s
action affects net congestion cost identically, players eventually oscillate uninformatively
between the two actions indefinitely. Yet as k becomes arbitrarily small, these uninformative
oscillations can only occur at extreme public likelihood ratios.
The following proposition, whose proof is omitted because it follows from the results in
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Subsections 4.3–4.5, develops these results:
Proposition 1. Consider the leading examples.
1. In the linear-proportional-costs model, there is (i) complete learning if k ≥ 1; (ii)
bounded learning if k < 1; (iii) bounded learning in the no-congestion limit.
2. In the linear-absolute-costs model, there is (i) incomplete learning for any k > 0; but
(ii) learning with high probability in the no-congestion limit.
3. In a non-linear-proportional-costs model with an f(y(ai)) function whose range is
(−∞,∞), there is complete learning for any k > 0 and, hence, complete learning in
the no-congestion limit.
4. In a non-linear absolute cost model with an f(·) function whose range is bounded,
there is bounded learning for all sufficiently small k and bounded learning in the no-
congestion limit.
4.3 The no-congestion limit
We begin the formal analysis by studying learning in the no-congestion limit.
Definition 1. Total congestion is bounded if −∞ < inf ∆(ai) and sup ∆(ai) < +∞. Total
congestion is unbounded if
for any ai : lim ∆((ai, 1, 1, . . .)) = +∞ and lim ∆((ai,−1,−1, . . .)) = −∞.
Although unbounded total congestion and bounded total congestion are exclusive, they are
not exhaustive because each property is required to hold for all action sequences. In the
leading examples (Example 1 and Example 2), whether congestion is bounded or unbounded
depends on the range of the function f(·) in each case. In particular, the linear proportional
costs model has bounded total congestion whereas the linear absolute costs model has
unbounded total congestion.
Definition 2. There is bounded incremental congestion if
sup
ai
max{∆((ai, 1))−∆(ai),∆(ai)−∆((ai,−1))} <∞.
This condition simply requires that the marginal impact of any individual’s choice on net
congestion cost be bounded above; although it is strictly stronger than Assumption 2, it is
generally a mild requirement.
Theorem 1. If total congestion is unbounded and there is bounded incremental congestion,
then there is learning with high probability in the no-congestion limit. If total congestion is
bounded, then there is bounded learning in the no-congestion limit.
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Proof. The second statement of the theorem will be proved later as a consequence of Theo-
rem 3 and Proposition 2 (see Corollary 1); we prove here the first statement of the theorem.
Step 1: We first claim that for any x > 0, x /∈ Supp[lk∞] once k is small enough. Suppose
not, per contra, for some x > 0. Then, for any ε > 0, there is a sequence of k → 0 such that
for each k, there is positive probability that lk∞ ∈ Bε(x). For ε > 0 small enough, if lki and
lki+1 are both in Bε(x), then i’s private belief threshold (recall Lemma 1), call it bˆi, cannot
lie within some interval [b∗(x, ε), b∗(x, ε)] ( [b, b]; this follows from the fact that x > 0 and
lki+1 is derived through Bayesian-updating of l
k
i using either bi > bˆi (if ai = 1) or bi < bˆi (if
ai = −1). Moreover,
as ε→ 0, b∗(x, ε)→ b > 1/2 and b∗(x, ε)→ b < 1/2. (2)
Just as in the proof of Lemma 2, the belief threshold b∗(x, ε) can be mapped into a net-
congestion threshold, ∆∗(x, ε; k) > ∆(x; k) through the equation
1 + k∆∗(x, ε; k) = 2b∗(x, ε), (3)
and analogously b∗(x, ε) maps into a threshold ∆∗(x, ε; k) < ∆(x; k). For lki and l
k
i+1 to
both lie in Bε(x), it must be that ∆(a
i−1) /∈ [∆∗(x, ε; k),∆∗(x, ε; k)]. From (2) and (3), it
follows that for any small enough ε > 0,
as k → 0, ∆∗(x, ε; k)→ −∞ and ∆∗(x, ε; k)→ +∞. (4)
Now, for any small enough ε > 0, let t be a time on some sample path such that lki ∈ Bε(x)
for all i ≥ t. Since ∆(ai) /∈ [∆∗(x, ε; k),∆∗(x, ε; k)] for all i ≥ t, the fact that total congestion
is unbounded implies that there must be an infinite set of agents, I ⊆ {t, t + 1 . . . , } such
that for any i ∈ I, ∆ (ai) ≤ ∆∗(x, ε; k) whereas ∆((ai, 1)) ≥ ∆∗(x, ε; k). However, (4)
implies that for any ε > 0 small enough, ∆∗(x, ε; k) − ∆∗(x, ε; k) → ∞ as k → 0. The
hypothesis of bounded incremental congestion now implies that once k is small enough, if
∆
(
ai
) ≤ ∆∗(x, ε; k) then ∆((ai, 1)) < ∆∗(x, ε; k), a contradiction.
Step 2: We next claim that for any ε > 0 and δ > 0, Pr[lk∞ > ε] < δ for all small enough
k. To prove this, fix any ε > 0 and δ > 0. Let L be any number strictly larger than 1/δ.
By Fatou’s Lemma, E[lk∞] ≤ lk1 = 1, where the equality is from the neutral prior. This
implies that Pr[lk∞ > L] < δ: if not, we would have E[lk∞] ≥ δL > 1, a contradiction. The
claim now follows from Step 1’s implication that Supp[lk∞] ⊆ [0, ε] ∪ [L,∞) once k is small
enough.
For any ε > 0, by applying the above claim to a sequence of δ → 0, it holds that
limk→0 Pr[lk∞ ≤ ε] = 1; hence, there is learning with high probability in the no-congestion
limit. Q.E.D.
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Theorem 1 shows that whether learning is likely to occur when k gets small turns on
whether total congestion is unbounded. One can interpret the theorem as identifying a sense
in which the bounded learning conclusion of the standard model without congestion (recall
Remark 1) is fragile, but this requires recognizing in what sense our model does and does not
converge to the benchmark model as k → 0. To this end, let u˜i(ai, θ) = 1{ai=θ} represent
preferences in the model without congestion and u˜ki (a
i, θ) = ui(a
i, θ) = 1{ai=θ} − kc(ai)
represent preferences under congestion factor k > 0. Then, for any i and ε > 0, there exists
δ(i, ε) > 0 such that if k < δ(i, ε) then for all θ and all ai: |u˜ki (ai, θ) − u˜i(ai, θ)| < ε. In
other words, as k → 0, our model converges pointwise across players to the model without
congestion. However, when total congestion is unbounded, the convergence is not uniform:
the δ(i, ε) cannot be chosen independently of i. By contrast, there is uniform convergence
when total congestion is bounded.
4.4 Complete learning for any k > 0
We turn to the question of what properties of congestion costs assure complete learning for
an arbitrary k > 0. As suggested by the discussion in Subsection 4.2, one key condition
is that total congestion cost can become large enough in magnitude to prevent herds. In
addition, one must also ensure that players cannot perpetually oscillate between actions
without conveying any information about their private beliefs.
Definition 3. For any k > 0, total congestion can get large or is large if
for any ai : lim ∆((ai, 1, 1, . . .)) ≥ 1/k and lim ∆((ai,−1,−1, . . .)) ≤ −1/k.
Plainly, if total congestion can get large for some k > 0, then it also can get large for
k′ > k. In particular, total congestion is unbounded if, and only if, it can get large for all
k > 0.
Definition 4. Congestion has no gaps provided that for any ε > 0 and any non-convergent
infinite action sequence (a1, . . .): if S ⊆ R is a bounded interval and IS is an infinite set
of agents such that i ∈ IS ⇐⇒ ∆(ai) ∈ S, then there is some i∗S such that for any
i, j > i∗S with i, j ∈ IS and for any x ∈ (∆(ai),∆(aj)), there exists n > max{i, j} such that
∆(an) ∈ (x− ε, x+ ε).
Note that the no gaps condition is independent of k. While the condition may appear
complicated, it has a fairly straightforward interpretation. To see this, assume that total
congestion is bounded, and pick any non-convergent infinite sequence of actions. Roughly,
Definition 4 requires that if we choose any two agents, i and j, far enough down the
sequence, then the interval of net congestion costs (∆(ai),∆(aj)) can be arbitrarily finely
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“covered” by subsequent net congestion cost levels, in the sense that
⋃
n>max{i,j}
∆(an) creates
an arbitrarily fine grid in that interval.13
Theorem 2. If congestion has no gaps, then there is complete learning at any k > 0
for which total congestion can get large. Therefore, if congestion has no gaps and total
congestion is unbounded, there is complete learning at the no-congestion limit.
Proof. Fix some k > 0 and assume that total congestion can get large and congestion
has no gaps. We will prove that Supp[lk∞] = {0}. Suppose, per contra, that x > 0
and x ∈ Supp[lk∞]. Following the logic developed in the proof of Theorem 1 and using the
notation introduced there, we conclude that for any ε > 0 small enough, there must be a
sample path of actions (a1, . . .) and some time t such that
for all i ≥ t: either ∆(ai) ≤ ∆∗(x, ε; k) or ∆(ai) ≥ ∆∗(x, ε; k). (5)
Since large total congestion implies
lim ∆((ai,−1,−1, . . .)) ≤ −1/k ≤ ∆(x; k)
< ∆∗(x, ε; k)
< ∆∗(x, ε; k) < ∆(x, ε; k) ≤ 1/k ≤ lim ∆((ai, 1, 1, . . .)),
it follows that
|{i : i ≥ t and ∆(ai) ≤ ∆∗(x, ε; k)}| = |{i : i ≥ t and ∆(ai) ≥ ∆∗(x, ε; k)}| =∞.
Thus, given any i∗, we can find i, j > max{i∗, t} such that ∆(ai) ≤ ∆∗(x, ε; k) and
∆(aj) ≥ ∆∗(x, ε; k). Furthermore, because of quasi-bounded increments (Assumption 2),
(5) implies that there is some bounded interval, S(x, ε; k) ⊇ [∆∗(x, ε; k),∆∗(x, ε; k)], such
that ∆(ai) ∈ S(x, ε; k) for all i. It then follows from the no-gaps property that for some
n > t, ∆(an) ∈ (∆∗(x, ε; k),∆∗(x, ε; k)); but this contradicts (5). Q.E.D.
In terms of the no-congestion limit, Theorem 2 strengthens the positive conclusion
of Theorem 1 but requires congestion to have no-gaps rather than bounded incremental
congestion. More importantly, Theorem 2 can be applied to arbitrary k > 0.14
13Since we are concerned with what happens far enough in the action sequence, it would be more accurate to
call the property eventually no gaps, but we omit the “eventually” qualifier for brevity.
14The proof of Theorem 2 explicitly uses quasi-bounded increments (Assumption 2). To see the relevance of
this assumption, consider the modified version of the linear absolute cost model introduced in fn. 8 and recall that
this example violates Assumption 2. Observe that for any i and ai, either ∆(ai) ≥ i/2 or ∆(ai) < −i/2; hence
given any bounded interval, S, if i is large enough then for any ai, ∆(ai) /∈ S. Consequently, congestion has no
gaps and total congestion is unbounded. However, for any k > 0, learning is necessarily incomplete because for
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In Subsection 5.1, we introduce a condition called vanishing incremental congestion (see
Definition 7) that often may be easily verified in applications and implies that congestion
has no gaps. For example, the proportional-cost model with a continuous f(·) satisfies
this stronger condition (see fn. 19); moreover, total congestion is large in this model if
and only if, (−1/k, 1/k) ⊆ range[f(·)]. In particular, total congestion gets large in the
linear-proportional-cost model if and only if k ≥ 1. Similarly, in the absolute-cost model
total congestion is large if and only if f(·) is unbounded above; hence, the linear version
has large total congestion costs for all k > 0. However, the no gaps condition fails in the
linear absolute-cost model because ∆((ai, 1)) − ∆(ai) = ∆(ai) − ∆((ai,−1)) = 1 for all
ai. On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that when range[f(·)] is bounded, the
absolute-cost model satisfies the no gaps condition because it satisfies the stronger property
of vanishing incremental congestion.
4.5 Non-learning for any k > 0
Our final set of learning results derive sufficient conditions for incomplete and bounded
learning for arbitrary k > 0.
Definition 5. For any k > 0, congestion has gaps if there exists C(k) > 0 such that
for any infinite action sequence (a1, . . .), there exists i
∗ such that for all i > i∗, ∆(ai) /∈
(1/k − C(k), 1/k) ∪ (−1/k,−1/k + C(k)).
In words, the gaps condition precludes any infinite sequence of net congestion cost from
converging to 1/k from below or to −1/k from above. To see the intuition for why this
implies bounded learning, consider Figure 3, which depicts a sample path along which there
is learning. As the figure suggests, any sample path with learning requires that there be a
sequence of agents for whom net congestion cost converges to 1/k from below. We will show
subsequently how the gaps condition subsumes the intuitions provided in Subsection 4.2
about incomplete learning when congestion costs on one action never get large enough (see
Proposition 2 below) and when the incremental effect of a player’s action on successors’ net
congestion costs is never negligible.
Remark 2. Except in degenerate cases—such as when there are no congestion effects—the
gaps condition and the no gaps condition are incompatible. In particular, if total congestion
can get large, then both conditions cannot hold simultaneously.
A simple sufficient condition for congestion to have gaps for all k > 0 is that
the range of ∆(·) has no finite limit point.15 (6)
any i > 2k and any ai, ∆(ai) > 1/k or ∆(ai) < −1/k and hence i’s action is uninformative. In other words, in
any sample path of actions, an information cascade arises no later than time 2k + 1.
15For a given k > 0, an even weaker sufficient condition is that neither 1/k nor −1/k be a limit point of the
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Figure 3 – A sample path along which there is learning.
Clearly, the linear absolute cost model satisfies (6) because the range of ∆(·) in that case
is the integers (following any finite history).
Theorem 3. For any k > 0, if congestion has gaps then there is bounded learning. Fur-
thermore, if, for all k > 0 small enough, congestion has gaps and the constant C(k) in
Definition 5 can be chosen such that 1/k − C(k) is bounded above, then there is bounded
learning in the no-congestion limit.
Proof. For the first statement, fix any k > 0 and assume that congestion has gaps. Let
lˆ be defined by ∆(lˆ; k) = 1/k − C(k), where C(k) > 0 is from Definition 5; without
loss, we may take 1/k − C(k) > 0. Since ∆(·; k) is strictly decreasing from 1/k to −1/k
(Lemma 2), lˆ is well defined. Pick an arbitrary sample path of actions (a1, . . .). Since
1/k > ∆(l; k) > ∆(l; k) for all l > 0, it follows that if lki < lˆ then i plays uninformatively;
hence there cannot be an i such that lki <
1−r(b,lˆ)
r(b,lˆ)
, where the latter term is strictly larger
than 0. Since the sample path was arbitrary, it follows that there is bounded learning.
For the second statement, assume there is some z > 0 such that 1/k − C(k) < z for all
small enough k > 0. Define lˆ by ∆(lˆ; k) = z. The same argument as above can be used to
conclude that for any k > 0 small enough, min Supp[lk∞] ≥ 1−r(b,lˆ)r(b,lˆ) , which implies bounded
learning in the no-congestion limit. Q.E.D.
Remark 3. For a given k > 0, the gaps condition yields bounded learning because the
range of ∆(·).
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same constant C(k) in Definition 5 is required to apply for all infinite action sequences. If,
instead, the constant could depend on the action sequence, then we would only be able to
conclude incomplete learning rather than bounded learning.
Theorem 3 can be used to deduce what happens when total congestion cost is small in
the following sense:
Definition 6. For any k > 0, total congestion is small if −1/k < inf ∆(ai) and sup ∆(ai) <
1/k.
Proposition 2. For any k > 0, if total congestion is small then congestion has gaps. If total
congestion is bounded then congestion has gaps for all k > 0 small enough; furthermore,
the constant C(k) in Definition 5 can be chosen such that 1/k − C(k) is bounded above.
Proof. For the first statement, observe that for any k > 0, C(k) = 1/k − sup ∆(ai) verifies
Definition 5 when sup ∆(ai) < 1/k. The second statement follows because under bounded
total congestion, the same construction works for all k > 0 small enough, and in this case
1/k − C(k) is bounded above. Q.E.D.
Combining Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 yields:
Corollary 1. For any k > 0, if total congestion is small then there is bounded learning. If
total congestion is bounded then there is bounded learning in the no-congestion limit.
Recall from Remark 1 that in the benchmark model with no congestion, although herds
occur a.s., information cascades need not. Moreover, at any point where a cascade arises,
so too does a herd. A novel feature of our model with congestion costs is that information
cascades need not usher in herds. The next result describes properties of the net congestion
cost that guarantee the presence of an information cascade and simultaneously rule out
herding. These conditions are satisfied, for example, by the linear absolute cost model.
Proposition 3. If total congestion is unbounded and (6) holds, then for any k > 0 there
is almost surely an information cascade.
Proof. Fix k > 0 and pick any sample path (a1, . . .); let z be limit public likelihood ratio
on this sample path, which exists a.s. As total congestion is unbounded, the sample path
includes an infinite number of each action. Assume, to contradiction, that there is no
cascade. Then there is an infinite set of agents, I ′, who all take the same action and whose
actions are informative. Without loss, assume that i ∈ I ′ =⇒ ai = 1; the argument
proceeds mutatis mutandis in the other case. By the same logic used in proving Theorem 1,
it follows that for all small enough ε > 0, there exists iε such that for all i > iε, ∆(a
i) /∈
20
(∆(z; k) + ε,∆(z; k) − ε). By the continuity of ∆(·; k) and ∆(·; k), it further follows that
for all small enough ε > 0,
there is iε such that [i > iε and i ∈ I ′] =⇒ ∆(ai−1) ∈ (∆(z; k)− ε,∆(z; k) + ε).
In view of (6), the above condition can hold for ε > 0 small enough only if
there is i′ such that [i > i′ and i ∈ I ′] =⇒ ∆(ai−1) = ∆(z; k).
But this implies that eventually agents in I ′ behave uninformatively, a contradiction with
the definition of I ′. Q.E.D.
5 Action Convergence and Welfare
In this section we first study the effects of congestion costs on the asymptotic frequency of
actions. Because the proportion of agents who choose the superior action is an integral part
of any measure of welfare in this context, we study how different forms of congestion costs
affect this dimension of welfare. We also provide an interpretation of congestion costs in
term of transfer schemes and elaborate on the implication of this interpretation for welfare.
5.1 Action convergence
We first focus on convergence of the action frequency, i.e. limi→∞ y
(
ai
)
= limi→∞
|{aj=1:j≤i}|
i .
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This limit may not exist even if the state is known, as illustrated in Remark 4 below.17 We
will say that the correct action frequency is the limit action frequency that would obtain if
θ = 1 were known, assuming this limit exists.
Fairly strong conditions are needed to ensure the existence of a correct action frequency;
neither the no gaps condition nor gaps condition suffice. Accordingly, we will introduce two
new conditions, one stronger than no gaps and the other stronger than gaps.
Definition 7. There is vanishing incremental congestion if for any ε > 0, any infinite
sequence of actions (a1, . . .), and any interval (s, s) with ∞ > s > s > −∞, there exists an
index i′ such that if i > i′ and ∆(ai) ∈ (s, s), then ∣∣∆(ai+1)−∆(ai)∣∣ < ε.
Vanishing incremental congestion does not compel incremental congestion to die off if
total congestion is growing unboundedly, a generality which will be useful to subsume some
examples (cf. fn. 19). It requires that given any infinite action sequence, eventually any
16We have defined action convergence in terms of a = 1; this is without loss, since this converges if and only if
the frequency of a = −1 converges.
17Note that this is not possible in the standard model without congestion costs when the state is known.
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two successive players i and i+ 1 face net congestions that are arbitrarily similar.18 For ex-
ample, the proportional cost model with any continuous f(·) satisfies vanishing incremental
congestion.19
Proposition 4. Vanishing incremental congestion implies that congestion has no gaps.
Proof. Fix any non-convergent infinite sequence of actions (a1, . . .) and any ε > 0. Pick
any bounded interval S ⊆ R and any infinite set of agents IS = {n1, n2, . . .} such that
i ∈ IS ⇐⇒ ∆(ai) ∈ S; if such an S and IS do not exist then we are trivially done. From
the definition of vanishing incremental congestion, there are two exclusive and exhaustive
possibilities: either (i) x∗ = limk→∞∆(ank) exists, or (ii) there is a non-singleton closed
interval S′ ⊆ S such that for any S˜ ( S′ and any j, there is some i > j such that
∆(ai) ∈ S′ \ S˜, i.e. S′ is the minimal set such that among agents in IS , ∆(·) is eventually
in S′.
Assume case (i). This implies that there is some i∗ such that ∆
(
ai
) ∈ (x∗ − ε/2, x∗ + ε/2)
for all i > i∗ with i ∈ IS . This implies that for any i, j > i∗ with i, j ∈ IS , and any
x ∈ (∆(ai),∆(aj)), it holds that for all n > max{i, j} with n ∈ IS , ∆(xn) ∈ (x− ε, x+ ε).
This satisfies the requirement of no gaps.
Now consider case (ii). Let i∗ be any time such that ∆(ai) ∈ S′ for all i > i∗ and i ∈ IS .
By definition of S′, vanishing incremental congestion implies that for any x ∈ S′, there must
be an infinite set of agents, I ′ ⊆ IS , such that for all i ∈ I ′, ∆(ai) ∈ (x − ε, x + ε). This
implies that the requirement of no gaps is satisfied because for any i, j > i∗ with i, j ∈ IS ,
∆(ai) ∈ S′ and ∆(aj) ∈ S′. Q.E.D.
Definition 8. There is constant incremental congestion if there existsN ∈ {..., 13 , 12 , 1, 2, 3, ...}
and x ≥ 0 such that in any infinite sequence (a1, . . .), there is some i′ such that for any
i > i′, (i) ai = 1 =⇒ ∆(ai)−∆(ai−1) = x; and (ii) ai = −1 =⇒ ∆(aj−1)−∆(aj) = Nx.
Constant incremental congestion requires that in any infinite sequence of actions even-
tually (after some time that may depend on the sequence), two properties must hold: (i)
18Vanishing incremental congestion essentially combines two ideas: first, player i’s own action should not affect
net congestion by much; second, and more subtle, the manner by which the actions of players 1, . . . , i − 1 enter
into player i’s preferences as congestion must be similar to how they enter player i + 1’s preferences. Although
reasonable in many contexts, vanishing incremental congestion rules out various kinds of time-varying congestion
costs.
19This is because given any interval [y1, y2] (with y1 > 0 if limy→0 f(y) = −∞ and y2 < 1 if limy→1 f(y) =∞),
any infinite sequence of actions in which the net congestion always lies within this interval has the following
property: given any ε > 0, there is i′ such that for any ai with i > i′,
max{f(y((ai, 1)))− f(y(ai)), f(y(ai))− f(y((a1,−1)))} < ε.
This follows from the continuity of f(·) and that eventually any one player’s choice has negligible effect on y(·).
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the incremental net congestion effect of any action 1 is constant and analogously for ac-
tion −1; (ii) while possibly different from each other, these two constants must be integer
multiples.20 Note that the multiple must be independent of the particular action sequence.
The linear absolute cost model satisfies constant incremental congestion with N = 1. It is
transparent that constant incremental congestion implies that congestion has gaps.
Lemma 3. Assume the true state is known to be θ = 1. Then,
1. if total congestion is small, the action frequency converges to 1;
2. if total congestion is large and there is constant incremental congestion, the action
frequency converges to 11+N , where N is from the definition of constant incremental
congestion.
3. if total congestion is large and there is vanishing incremental congestion, and in addi-
tion if ∆(ai) can be written as one-to-one function of y(ai), then the action frequency
converges to y such that ∆(y) = 1/k.
Proof. The first part is trivial: if total congestion is small and θ = 1 is known, then all
agents choose a = 1. For the second part, assume constant incremental congestion and
that total congestion is large. Assume N ≥ 1; the logic is analogous if N < 1. By constant
incremental and large total congestion, eventually the sequence of actions looks like. . . , 1,−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
, 1,−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
, 1, . . .
 ,
with ∆(ai) jumping from below 1/k to above at each action of 1, and then staying above 1/k
until the N -th consecutive action of −1 switches it to below 1/k. The conclusion now follows
from the fact that this eventual pattern determines the asymptotic action frequency.21
For the third part, assume that total congestion is large and that there is vanishing
incremental congestion. Then, asymptotically ∆ = 1/k, and it follows that if ∆ is a 1-1
function of the action frequency, then the action frequency must converge. Q.E.D.
Example 1, continued. In the linear-proportional-cost model with k ≥ 1, ∆ depends only
on the action frequency, hence the correct action frequency is given by y∗ = 1+k2k .
22 If k < 1
then y∗ = 1. 
Example 2, continued. Recall that the linear-absolute-cost model has a constant incremental
congestion, with N = 1. It follows from Lemma 3 that in this case the correct action
20Since these properties are only required after some arbitrarily large finite time, it would be more accurate to
call the condition eventually-constant incremental congestion; we drop the “eventually” qualifier to ease termi-
nology.
21Note that we are using here the fact that the value of N is independent of the sample path of actions.
22The correct action frequency when θ = −1 and k < 1 is y∗ = (k − 1)/2k.
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frequency is 1/2. Note that, perhaps surprisingly, this is independent of k. Next, consider
a generalization of the linear absolute cost model to one where c
(
ai−1, 1
)
= δ
∑i−1
j=1 1{aj=1}
for some δ > 0 whereas c
(
ai−1,−1) = ∑i−1j=1 1{aj=1}. Then ∆ (ai, 1) − ∆ (ai) = δ while
∆
(
ai
) − ∆ (ai,−1) = 1. So there is still a constant incremental congestion, but now
N = 1/δ. Therefore, the correct action frequency is δ/(1 + δ). 
Remark 4. Assume θ = 1 is known. Somewhat surprisingly, the action frequency need
not converge when total congestion can get large even if there is vanishing incremental
congestion. This is because we can construct a cost function that satisfies large total
congestion and vanishing incremental congestion and yet the sequence of actions consists
of a block of 1’s followed by a block of -1’s and so on, with the length of each block being
such that sufficiently far in the sequence, whenever a block of 1’s is over, y(·) ≈ 1, whereas
whenever a block of -1’s is over, y(·) ≈ 0.
The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for action frequency convergence in
the game of social learning and relates them to the correct action frequency.
Proposition 5.
1. If total congestion is small then a herd occurs almost surely (hence, almost surely there
is action convergence), and with positive probability is on the wrong action.
2. If total congestion can get large and there is constant incremental congestion, then
the action frequency converges almost surely, and when it converges, the limit is the
correct action frequency.
3. If total congestion can get large, there is vanishing incremental congestion and ∆(ai)
can be written as one-to-one function of y(ai), then the action frequency does converge
almost surely and the limit is the correct action frequency.
Proof. Part 1: Since learning is bounded (by Corollary 1), the public LR either converges
to some lk∞ ∈ (0, l′), where l′ is such that ∆(l′, k) = inf ∆(·), or to some lk∞ > l′′ where l′′ is
such that ∆(l′′, k) = sup ∆(·). In the former case, at some point players will start choosing
action 1 forever, i.e. there is a herd on action 1. In the latter case, at some point players
will start choosing action −1 forever, i.e. there is a herd on action 0. So a.s. there is a herd.
Since private beliefs are bounded, both herds can occur with positive probability.
Part 2: The public LR a.s. converges to some lk∞, and, because of bounded learning,
lk∞ > 0. Since total congestion is large, it must be that asymptotically ∆ is oscillating from
above ∆(lk∞, k) to below ∆(lk∞, k) (not necessarily switching based on just one action in
both directions, of course). Since there is constant incremental congestion with factor N ,
the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3 applies.
Part 3: If total congestion can get large and there is vanishing incremental congestion,
then Proposition 4 and Theorem 2 implies that there is complete learning. Hence, lki → 0
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a.s. Moreover, by vanishing incremental congestion, we must asymptotically a.s. have
∆ = 1/k. Since ∆(ai) is a one-to-one function of the action frequency, then the the fact
that asymptotically ∆ = 1/k a.s. implies that the action frequency a.s. converges. That
the limit is the correct action frequency now follows form Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Example 2, continued. It follows directly from Proposition 5 (part 2) that in the abso-
lute linear cost model (and its asymmetric generalization mentioned earlier), the action
frequency converges almost surely to the correct one, which is 1/2. 
Example 1, continued. In the proportional linear cost model with k < 1, part 3 of the
Proposition 5 implies that a herd occurs almost surely and there is a positive probability
that the limit frequency of action 1 is one and a positive probability that it is zero.
When k ≥ 1, it follows directly from Proposition 5 (part 1) that the limit frequency of
action 1 is the correct frequency, y∗ = 1+k2k . When k = 1, only action 1 is played in the
long run. When k > 1, despite having complete learning, both actions are played in the
long-run. For every finite k, action 1 is played more often than action −1, but as k grows,
this difference decreases and, when k goes to infinity, there is an equal proportion of agents
choosing both actions. Intuitively, as k increases (above 1) a smaller proportions of agents
need to choose action 1 before a subsequent agent has the incentives to switch to action −1.
Interestingly, when k goes to infinity, the action frequency in the linear proportional cost
model converges to the same level that is obtained, for arbitrary k, in the linear absolute
cost model. 
5.2 Welfare
In our model, congestion affects players’ behavior entirely through the net congestion cost.
In particular, our model is isomorphic to one with congestion benefits where the benefit
added to action a is the cost we subtract from action −a. Framing congestion as a cost or
as a benefit will clearly affect any welfare conclusion drawn by comparing people’s utilities
across models. For this reason, we focus on a component of welfare common to all such
measures, namely the frequency with which agents choose the superior action (the one that
matches the realized state). An additional reason for focusing on this component is that, as
we will see, a social planner can use congestion costs as transfers to improve the outcome
of a canonical observational learning model.
Under autarky, more than half of all agents choose the superior action. Because each
agent in the model without congestion has more information than under autarky, the pro-
portion of agents who choose the superior action exceeds that under autarky. The next
proposition investigates the proportion of agents who choose the superior action under
different forms of congestion costs.
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Proposition 6.
1. If total congestion can get large and there is constant incremental congestion, then,
ex-ante, the proportion of agents who eventually choose the superior action is 1/2.
2. If total congestion can get large, there is vanishing incremental congestion and ∆(ai)
can be written as one-to-one function of y(ai), then, ex-ante, the proportion of agents
who eventually choose the superior action is 1/2 + (1/2)[∆−1(1/k)−∆−1(−1/k)].
Proof. Part 1 From Part 2 of Proposition 5 and Part 2 of Lemma 3, the action frequency
converges almost surely to 1/(1 + N), regardless of the realized state. So, ex-ante, the
proportion of agents who choose the superior action is 12
1
1+N +
1
2
N
1+N = 1/2.
Part 2 From Part 3 of Proposition 5 and Part 3 of Lemma 3, the action frequency
converges almost surely to ∆−1(1/k), when the realized state is 1, and to ∆−1(−1/k), when
the realized state is −1. So, ex-ante, the proportion of agents who choose the superior action
is (1/2)∆−1(1/k) + (1/2)(1−∆−1(−1/k)) = 1/2 + (1/2)[∆−1(1/k)−∆−1(−1/k)]. Q.E.D.
Although congestion costs may enable complete learning, the first part of Proposition 6
shows that congestion costs do not necessarily lead agents to choose the superior action more
frequently than they do in the standard model without congestion, even in very natural
environments. For instance, in the linear-absolute-cost model, half of all players choose the
inferior action, more than would do so in the model without congestion. Indeed, in this
case, fewer players choose the superior action than do so under autarky!
The second part of Proposition 6 implies that, in some environments, the proportion of
agents who choose the superior action converges to 1. Consider, for instance, the linear-
proportional-cost model when total congestion is large, k ≥ 1. There, the proportion of
agents choosing the superior action is (1 + k)/2k when the state is 1, and (k + 1)/2k when
the state is −1, and therefore, the ex-ante proportion of agents choosing the superior action
is (1+k)/2k. When k = 1, the fraction of agents who eventually choose the superior action
is one. The higher is k, the lower is the proportion of agents who eventually choose the
superior action, and this proportion converges to 1/2 as k goes to ∞.
An interesting corollary is that in the canonical observational learning model without
congestion, a social planner could use a very simple transfer scheme to ensure that asymp-
totically, all agents will choose the superior action. This is achieved by effectively creating
congestion costs that take the form of the linear proportional model with k = 1. For ex-
ample, a social planner could require agent i to pay an amount τi(a
i−1) = y(ai−1) if he
chooses action 1, and pay τi(a
i−1) = 1− y(ai−1) if agent i chooses action −1. The transfer
of agent i can be redistributed as a form of subsidy to subsequent agents (independent of
their choices). Under this simple transfer scheme, regardless of the realization of the state,
in the long-run the fraction of agents who take the superior action is one.
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6 Applications
6.1 Pricing as congestion
Our results can be applied to simple model where congestion cost is induced by a price
mechanism. There are two products, A and B. It is common knowledge that one product
is of high quality and the other of low quality, but consumers do not know which is which.
We represent A being a high-quality product by the state θ = 1, whereas θ = −1 represents
product B being of high quality. Gross of price, the value of the high-quality product to
any consumer is 1, while the low-quality product yields 0. Denote the decision to purchase
product A by ai = 1 and the decision to purchase product B as ai = −1. Consumers choose
sequentially and a consumer observes all previous history.
Assume that product pricing is as follows: after history ai, the price of product A
equals a constant k ≤ 1 times its expected value condition on the public information.
When k = 1, the application is similar to the leading example of Avery and Zemsky (1998).
Settings where k < 1 can be interpreted as settings in which there is competition between
sellers who face zero marginal costs of production. At the extreme, the case where k = 0
corresponds to perfect or Bertrand competition.
Using our notation for public beliefs, the price of good A after history ai is kq(ai), while
the price of product B is k[1− q(ai)]. Thus, ignoring indifference as usual, consumer i+ 1
with private beliefs p chooses ai+1 = 1 (i.e. buy A) if and only if
r(p, q(ai))− kq(ai) > 1− r(p, q(ai))− k[1− q(ai)],
or equivalently, r(p, q(ai)) > 1/2 + (k/2)(2q(ai)− 1).
Even though there is no explicit congestion cost, the (endogenous) price has a similar
effect. Indeed, for arbitrary k ≤ 1, defining the net congestion cost ∆(ai) := 2q(ai) − 1 =
1−l(ai)
1+l(ai)
implies that the posterior belief threshold in our general model becomes r∗(·) =
1/2+k∆(·)/2, as required for this application.23 Note that ∆(ai), as defined above, satisfies
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. We now consider two cases.
Case A. Suppose k = 1. Since private beliefs are informative (i.e. b > 1/2 > b), we
have that for any ai, r(b, l(ai)) > q(ai). Consequently, ∆(·; 1) has the property that for any
l > 0, there exists x(l) > 0 such that if l(ai) = l then
∆(ai) ≤ ∆(l; 1)− x(l).24 (7)
23Even though the ∆(ai) function thus defined depends indirectly on the strategies of the agents (because they
affect the public belief), one can proceed recursively from agent one onward and just substitute this out.
24In particular, one can choose x(l) = ∆(l; 1)−∆(ai) = b−(1−b)l
b+(1−b)l − 1−l1+l .
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Similarly, for any l > 0, there is exists x(l) > 0 such that if l(ai) = l then ∆(ai) ≥
∆(l; 1) − x(l). It follows that actions are always informative on the path of play, hence
lim ∆(ai, 1, 1, ......) = 1 and total congestion can get large. Now suppose that complete
learning fails. Then, there is some x > 0 that is in Supp[lk∞]. Following the argument used
in the proof of Theorem 2, for any ε > 0 there must be some ai and some t such that (5)
with k = 1 holds. But as ε → 0, ∆∗(x, ε; 1) → ∆(x; 1) (recall the proof of Theorem 1),
which contradicts (7).
Case B. Suppose k < 1. Then, since 1/k > 1 while ∆(·) ∈ (−1, 1), the setting satisfies
small total congestion. Hence, Corollary 1 implies that there is bounded learning, and
the first part of Proposition 5 that there will be herd, which may be correct or incorrect.
Indeed, since the setting has bounded total congestion (because ∆(ai) = 2q(ai)− 1 implies
that lim ∆(ai, 1, 1, ...) ≤ 1 < 1/k and lim ∆(ai,−1,−1, ...) ≥ −1 > −1/k ), so we have
bounded learning in the no-congestion limit.
Although we do not pursue it formally here, we could modify Avery and Zemsky (1998)
in a different direction by assuming that the price updates after every N > 1 trades instead
of after every trade, perhaps because some technological constraint prevents instant price-
updating. In a setting with binary signals, there is an equilibrium in which the only people
who play informatively are those who move first after a price change (plus the initial mover).
Another variation on Avery and Zemsky (1998) limits prices to lid on a grid, e.g. pounds
and pence. Because this restriction satisfies gaps, Theorem 3 implies bounded learning.
6.2 Queuing as congestion
In this section, we modify the linear-absolute-cost model of Example 2 to incorporate the
idea that more recent predecessors exert larger effect on congestion costs than do more
distant predecessors.
In the queuing model with constant, unobservable service rate, c(a1) = 0 and for each
i ≥ 2,
c
(
ai
)
=
i−1∑
j=1
1{aj=ai}δ
i−j−1,
for some δ ∈ [0, 1). In the extreme case where δ = 0, every player cares only about her
immediate predecessor’s action. When δ > 0, congestion depends more strongly upon
recent than upon distant predecessors’ choices. This cost function naturally generalizes
a queueing model to allow for a constant service rate. For instance, player k may have
observed whether each player j < k entered restaurant a = −1 or restaurant a = 1 through
the front door. However, she may not know whether j was served and exited through the
restaurant’s unobservable back door or remains. If she is risk neutral and believes that a
j < k − 1 who remains in the restaurant exits every period with probability 1 − δ, and
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player k − 1 remains for sure, then she faces the congestion costs described above.
We observe that for any ai,
∆(ai, 1) = 1 + δ∆(ai) and ∆(ai,−1) = δ∆(ai)− 1.
Furthermore, for any ai, lim ∆(ai, 1, 1, . . .) = 11−δ , and lim ∆(a
i,−1,−1, . . .) = − 11−δ .
Hence, total congestion is bounded. Total congestion can get large when k ≥ 1−δ, whereas
it is small when k < 1− δ. For δ = 0, it is easy to check that there is constant incremental
congestion; hence, congestion has gaps. These properties, together with Theorem 1, imply
the following:
Corollary 2. In the queuing model with constant unobservable service rate, δ ∈ [0, 1), there
is bounded learning in the no-congestion limit.
We now consider the case where service is observable. In the restaurant context, whereas
above diners departed through an unobservable back door, here they depart through the ob-
servable front door. Define the binary 0-1 random variable Sj(t) to equal 1 with probability
1 when t = j + 1, and for each t ≥ j + 1,
Pr[Sj(t+ 1) = 1|Sj(t) = 1] = δ, Pr[Sj(t+ 1) = 1|Sj(t) = 0] = 0.
Sj(t) is an indicator variable that describes whether Player j remains unserved through
period t. Player i faces the congestion cost
c
(
ai
)
=
i−1∑
j=1
1{aj=ai}Sj(i).
In words, player i pays 1 for every unserved predecessor who chose her same action. Note
that the cost faced by any player is now stochastic.
Observe that for any δ > 0 and any k > 0, congestion costs get arbitrarily large with
probability one (e.g., when Sj(·) = 1 sufficiently many periods in a row). Using this fact,
one can show that:
Corollary 3. In the queuing model with constant observable service rate, δ ∈ (0, 1), there
is learning with high probability in the no-congestion limit.
We omit the proof because it follows the same logic as that of Theorem 1, with straight-
forward modifications to account for the stochastic costs. The contrast between Corollary 2
and Corollary 3 reiterates the theme that what is important for learning is not that every
player must play informatively, but rather that it is always inevitable that some player in
the future will do so.
29
7 Conclusion
We have investigated the role of congestion costs in an otherwise standard model of ob-
servational learning. Congestion costs capture situations in which an agent’s payoff from
choosing an option deceases when more of his predecessors choose that option. This fea-
ture arises naturally in markets through changing prices, and also in other environments
where costs may stem from delays in service. Our analysis illustrates how different forms
of congestion costs impact long-run outcomes in terms of learning, action frequency, and
welfare.
While we have focussed on settings where an agent finds action A increasingly attractive
as more of his predecessors choose action B (and vice-versa), our approach can also be used
to analyze situations where the direction of the externality is reversed. Formally, this just
requires reversing the inequalities in the monotonicity assumption (Assumption 1). It is
not hard to check that in this case, given bounded private beliefs, for any k > 0 there is
bounded learning and a.s. a herd.25
We have focussed on the case of bounded private beliefs, but the analysis can also be
extended to unbounded private beliefs. In that case, complete learning obtains under small
total congestion.26 More interestingly, with large total congestion, complete learning may
fail, in contrast to the model without congestion. For example, in the linear absolute-cost
model, when k > 0 is sufficiently small, complete learning fails even under unbounded
private beliefs. On the other hand, there is still learning with high probability in the no-
congestion limit so long as incremental congestion is bounded, as in the linear absolute-cost
model.
A key assumption in this paper is that only past actions affects the payoff of an agent.
Consider the case of betting, where each bettor i bets on which of two locations a prize lies
in. In some fixed-odds systems used by bookmakers, each bettor receives odds that depend
on how many prior bettors have chosen each location, consistent with the backward-looking
congestion costs of our model. In parimutuel betting, however, each bettor receives odds
that depend on how many agents have chosen each location by the close of the betting
pool. In this system, a bettor must consider not only his beliefs about the superior action
and his predecessors’ choices, but potentially also how his action influences the bets of his
successors. Extending our analysis to such environments is a challenging but promising
area of further research.27
25Under mild conditions one can also show that there is a.s. an information cascade. For example, the following
condition will be sufficient for an information cascade: there exists ε > 0 such that for any (ai, 1, 1, ....) and any
j > i, ∆(aj) > ε (and analogously if there is a herd on −1), where ∆(aj) is now the net benefit that individual j
derives from taking action 1 rather than −1.
26If private beliefs are unbounded we have that ∆(l; k) = 1/k and ∆(l; k) = −1/k, and hence an agents’s action
is always informative under small total congestion.
27Koessler et al. (2008) make some progress with characterizing equilibrium behavior for sequential parimutuel
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Finally, we wish to emphasize the role that full rationality plays in the results. To see
this, consider the contrast with Eyster and Rabin (2010)’s simple model of “na¨ıve herd-
ing”, in which players misconstrue their predecessors as basing their behavior solely upon
their own private signals, failing to recognize that their predecessors perform informational
inference as well. Eyster and Rabin (2010) show that not only do na¨ıve players herd in a
stronger sense than rational ones, but they also do so in a much broader set of environ-
ments. Indeed, unlike with rational players, congestion costs generally does not enhance
social learning with naive players. Consider, for example, the linear-absolute-costs model
with binary signals and small k. Once two more private signals favor action a ∈ {−1, 1}
over action −a, a temporary herd forms on a, during which the na¨ıve players interpret
each a choice as an additional private signal in favor of a. As k is small, they develop
strong confidence in a being superior before congestion induces switching. In fact, because
na¨ıve players expect their predecessors to base their behavior solely on congestion and their
private binary signal, they expect predecessors to start playing −a uninformatively long
before people actually do. If we make the assumption that a na¨ıve player surprised to see
her predecessor choose a never interprets that as evidence in favor of −a, then the strong
confidence in a being superior will not be weakened at all before congestion drives people
to finally break the herd, and the congestion-induced break in the herd will be deemed
uninformative. In the limit as k → 0, therefore, the probability that na¨ıve players become
fully confident in the wrong state equals the likelihood that rational players herd on the
wrong action without congestion.
This once more clarifies the essential driving force of the rational learning results in
this paper: small incremental but large total congestion guarantees that aggregate behavior
repeatedly returns to situations where marginal behavior is informative. Our result relies on
the correct reading of that informational content. Departures from full rationality might not
completely reverse this result; for example, if players made random errors in understanding
the meaning of congestion-induced behavior, we conjecture the results would be much the
same. But systematically misconstruing that informational content is likely to undermine
these results. In the case of naivety, because players infer too little from those avoiding
congestion, players may never unlearn the lessons from the original crowds. If players
somehow exaggerated the meaning of avoiding congestion relative to living with congestion,
beliefs might never converge.
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